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Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	
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	Summary	
	
This	Briefing	Paper	explores	the	food	terrain	exposed	by	the	wider	Brexit	versus	Bremain	Referendum	
question	to	be	decided	by	the	voting	UK	public	on	June	23.	It	is	written	to	raise	issues;	to	invite	academics	
and	civil	society	working	on	food	matters	to	consider	how	their	work	fits	this	momentous	issue;	and	to	aid	
informed	decisions.	The	Paper	follows	from	debates	and	concerns	expressed	at	the	6
th
	City	Food	
Symposium	on	UK	food	and	Brexit	held	on	December	14,	2015.
3
			
This	Briefing	Paper	is	in	two	parts.	Readers	who	are	already	conversant	with	UK	and	EU	food	policy	
history	and	the	reasons	for	the	UK	Referendum	on	June	23	might	wish	to	skip	or	skim	Part	1	where	these	
issues	are	covered.		This	first	section	explains	how	the	UK	is	where	it	is	on	this	debate.	Part	2	goes	into	
some	key	issues	at	stake	in	the	June	23	vote.	This	section	is	where	we	summarise	some	of	the	implications	
of	leaving	the	EU,	the	so-called	Brexit	option.	We	also	explain	why	we	are	in,	and	what	voting	to	stay	
entails,	the	Bremain	option.			
The	analysis	presented	in	this	Briefing	Paper	is	as	follows:	
• The	UK	is	heavily	dependent	on	other	EU	member	states	for	food.	UK	food	production	is	below	60%	of	
consumption	and	particularly	reliant	on	imports	for	fruit	and	many	vegetables.	Supporters	of	Brexit	
have	not	once	addressed	the	UK’s	dependency	on	EU	producers	and	suppliers.	
• The	UK	suffers	a	huge	food	trade	gap	of	£21bn.	Not	only	is	the	UK	reliant	on	the	rest	of	Europe	for	
food	but	this	imbalance	is	a	drain	on	the	national	balance	of	payments.	
• The	post-Brexit	food	world	will	be	characterised	by	volatility,	disruption	and	uncertainty.	Food	
import	costs	will	rise	if	the	price	of	sterling	falls.	UK	exposure	to	world	commodity	prices	and	
competition	with	large	trade	trade	blocs	would	rise.		
• The	Common	Agricultural	Policy	(CAP)	and	the	Common	Fisheries	Policy	(CFP)	are	significant	control	
mechanisms	in	food	and	both	need	further	reform.	CAP	has	paid	large	sums	to	food	and	farm	
corporations	and	the	CFP	has	produced	waste	and	mismatch	fishing.	The	CAP	has	pushed	up	land	
																																								 																					
1
 Prof Tim Lang is Professor of Food Policy at the Centre for Food Policy, City University 
London e: t.lang@city.ac.uk  He is PI and Chair of the Food Research Collaboration: 
2
 Dr Victoria Schoen is an agricultural economist and Research Fellow at the Food Research 
Collaboration, a national collaboration of academics and civil society,	funded by the Esmée 
Fairbairn Foundation.  E: victoria.schoen.1@city.ac.uk 
3
 The 6
th
 City Food Symposium ‘UK, Food and Europe: implications of Brexit’ was held on 
December 14, 2015 at City University London, organised with the Food Research 
Collaboration. For summaries, film and Powerpoints of the 14 talks, see: 
http://foodresearch.org.uk/food-symposium-at-city-university-london/ The Centre for Food 
Policy and the Food Research Collaboration thank the Worshipful Company of Cooks and 
the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation for their financial support.		 
F
o
o
d
 R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
 C
o
ll
a
b
o
r
a
ti
o
n
	
	
2	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
values	while	the	CFP	has	put	many	fisherfolk	out	of	work.	But	many	failings	have	been	addressed	and	
there	is	a	case	for	further	improvement	rather	than	abandonment.	
• The	initial	focus	of	the	Brexit	debate	has	been	farming	rather	than	food,	yet	the	UK	food	system	
employs	more	than	six	times	more	people	outside	farming.	It	is	food	that	matters	as	well	as	farming.		
• The	EU	food	system	needs	urgent	reform	and	a	change	of	direction.	If	current	change	is	too	slow	and	
vested	interests	are	too	powerful,	Brexit	merely	adds	new	complications,	risks	and	uncertainties.	
• The	key	questions	facing	the	food	system	include	sustainability,	demographic	change,	changes	in	diet	
and	supply	chains	and	the	shift	to	more	healthy	foods.	The	UK	and	the	EU	food	systems,	whether	the	
UK	stays	in	or	leaves,	need	to	move	rapidly	in	a	more	sustainable	direction.		
• 	The	UK,	EU	and	global	food	systems	face	immense	challenges	and	Brexit	is	a	diversion.	With	over	4	
decades	of	involvement	in	the	EU	a	Brexit	will	generate	additional	food	system	stress.		
• The	case	made	for	Brexit	operates	on	false	assumptions.	Those	in	favour	of	Brexit	assume	that	
markets	and	contracts,	not	relationships	and	mutual	obligations,	are	the	best	way	to	resolve	current	
problems.	This	is	a	false	perspective.		EU-wide	and	international	collaboration	is	needed	to	improve	the	
terms	of	trade.		
• Those	favouring	Brexit	say	that	the	EU	is	cumbersome	and	weakens	political	sovereignty.		The	case	
for	Bremain	is	that	the	UK	can	put	its	huge	negotiating	weight	behind	promoting	progressive	change.	
• The	food	case	for	Brexit	has	largely	been	uncharted	bar	some	thought	by	UKIP	on	farming.	Politicians	
need	to	be	pressed	on	what	they	would	do,	following	Brexit.	The	food	case	for	Bremain	is	that	it	
retains	existing	moves	to	engage	with	the	sustainability	challenge	with	other	EU	Member	States.	Much	
could	be	also	done	by	the	UK	Government	on	its	own,	such	as	reducing	diet-related	ill-health,	
rebuilding	horticulture,	and	beginning	to	cut	the	diet-related	carbon	footprint.		
• Brexit	would	mean	that	a	vast	and	complicated	range	of	contracts,	trade	deals	and	systems	of	
governance	which	underpin	UK	food	would	have	to	be	renegotiated.	One	possibility	would	be	to	leave	
the	existing	rules	in	place	and	then	modify	them	slowly;	but	if	so,	why	leave,	when	the	EU	is	constantly	
a	process	of	slow	change	in	the	first	place?	
• More	attention	is	needed	on	how	to	manage	the	transition,	should	the	public	vote	for	Brexit;	the	
consequences	of	disruption	are	potentially	considerable.		
The	Briefing	provides:	
• a	background	to	the	Referendum	and	the	history	of	the	Europeanisation	of	UK	food	policy;	
• a	summary	of	the	food	policies	and	processes	involved	in	UK	membership;	
• facts	and	figures	on	where	UK	food	comes	from,	its	dependencies	and	the	large	food	trade	gap;	
• some	milestones	in	the	UK’s	43	years	of	EU	engagement;	
• a	list	of	UK	Government	food	responsibilities;	
• a	list	of	issues	at	stake	on	June	24:	security,	governance	processes,	prices,	health,	environment,	labour;	
• options	for	food	life	after	Brexit;		
• encouragement	to	academics	and	civil	society	to	research,	question	and	debate	this	further.	
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4	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
PART	1:	BACKGROUND	TO	THE	EU	REFERENDUM	ON	THE	EU	
This	Briefing	Paper	is	in	two	parts.	Readers	who	are	already	conversant	with	UK	and	EU	food	policy	history	
and	the	reasons	for	the	UK	Referendum	on	June	23	might	wish	to	skip	or	skim	Part	1	where	these	issues	are	
covered.		Part	1	explains	how	the	UK	is	where	it	is	on	this	debate.	We	summarise	what	the	EU	food	system	
and	policy	is,	why	the	UK	joined	and	what	this	all	means.	We	give	the	background	to	the	Referendum	and	
the	so-called	Brexit	option.	Part	2	provides	a	list	of	issues	at	stake	in	the	June	23	vote.		This	Briefing	Paper	
follows	from	debates	and	concerns	expressed	at	the	6
th
	City	Food	Symposium	on	UK	food	and	Brexit	held	
on	December	14,	2015.
4
		The	Symposium	raised	many	questions	which	this	paper	set	out	to	address.
5
	
	
	
1.		 Introduction	
On Friday February 19, 2016, after two days of tense negotiations among the 28 
European Union (EU) member states, the British Prime Minister agreed a deal on a 
reform package about Britain and the EU.[1] This concluded what had been a 
delicate, eight month British negotiation with the other 27 member states. It came 
as no surprise, however. It delivered on a decision taken by the British cabinet to try 
to chart a different course for the UK in the EU, promised in the Conservative Party 
election manifestos for both the 2014 European and 2015 UK elections.[2, 3] The 
Party has long held very strongly divergent views, but there was a consensus that 
this could be put to the people. The Conservative Government made it clear in its 
negotiations that, while it favoured staying in, it would only recommend this to 
voters if there was real change.  
The wording of the supposedly ‘crunch’ issues of the British ‘Settlement’, as the 
February 19 European Council agreement is known, is important and will no doubt 
receive the attentions of policy and political scholars for some time. The terms and 
language subtly change according to location and audience. The February 2, 2016 
letter from Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, to the 28 leaders of EU 
member states gives ‘four baskets of the proposal’ as concerning: (a) economic 
governance, (b) competitiveness, (c) sovereignty, and (d) social benefits and free 
movement.[4]  For Prime Minister David Cameron, after the negotiations of 
February 18-19, these were made more explicit as: (a) financial protection (for the 
City, the pound, and to halt the domination of the Euro within EU policy), (b) 
European competitiveness (anti ‘red tape’), (c) restriction of access to UK welfare by 
intra-EU migrants, and (d) protection for the powers of the UK Parliament.[5] 
Although presentational emphases varied, the President and the Prime Minister said 
they were on the same policy ‘page’. The new Settlement was announced by the 
European Council as seven specific points: (a) the new Settlement itself; (b) specific 
issues on the banking union and further integration of the euro; (c) competitiveness; 
(d) a subsidiarity implementation mechanism and a burden reduction 
implementation mechanism; (e) indexation of child benefits exported to a Member 
State other than that where the worker resides; (f) a safeguard mechanism; (g) 
issues related to the abuse of the right of free movement of persons. 
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5	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
David Cameron concluded that the February 19 British Settlement gave sufficient 
change in the UK’s position in the EU (requiring legal modification) for him to be 
able to recommend to the British people that they should vote to stay in the EU.[6]   
As is known, some Cabinet members and a sizeable slice of his Party’s Members of 
Parliament chose to campaign to leave the EU, against the Prime Minister’s pro-EU 
recommendation. On February 22, the date for the referendum was announced in 
Parliament as June 23 2016. 
The background to this Party and Government commitment is well known and has 
long roots.[7]  Political values within the governing Conservative Party – let alone 
across the country – have been severely divided for decades. In 1973 when Prime 
Minister Edward Heath, a Conservative, took the UK into the Common Market, the 
Conservative Party was mostly in favour of joining, whereas the Labour Party was 
not and was if anything more divided. Today, those positions are said by some 
commentators to be almost inverted. The split on the British Right became clear 
when Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister. Known for her Eurosceptic views, it 
was she who actually sought and signed the 1986 Single European Act as good for 
business and heralding a new era of European ‘harmonization’. She first appointed 
Lord (Arthur) Cockfield to open up Europe and then, already doubting what she had 
sought, seemingly punished him by withdrawing him from his Commissioner role 
after he had delivered.[8]  Conservative Party tensions over Europe erupted fully in 
1993 under Prime Minister John Major whose 7 year premiership was characterised 
by its EU strife.[9]  
Over the years, the debate about Britain and the EU has ranged from the deeply 
ideological to the mundane, from the visceral to the cerebral, from Left to Right, 
from Atlanticist to Globalisers, from Localist to Globalist, from Nationalist to 
Continental, from pro-Business to pro-Consumer, and more. The UK ‘In or Out’ 
debate has been infused with many strands. What marks it out – and always has 
done – is the sensitivity of issues such as national identity, democracy, culture and 
trust. These issues are, incidentally, why the world of food becomes so important in 
the Brexit debate. For David Cameron, the Prime Minister, however, the immediate 
problem is his own Party’s tension and riding out the consequences of his decision 
to settle the matter and the future of the UK via the Referendum.  He has been 
quite clear about that in his statements, for example, that this is a ‘once in a 
generation moment’,[5] and that no second Referendum would be possible. This is 
the big movement, therefore. So how does this affect food? And how might food 
considerations affect it? To answer these questions, much in Part 2, we give some 
essential background.  
2.		 The	emergence	of	EU	and	UK	food	thinking		
Agriculture and what is today termed ‘food security’ were founding planks of the 
European policy the UK is now to vote on. In 1957, after an experiment in 1951 with 
setting up a Steel and Coal Community, six countries - Germany, France, Italy, 
Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg - signed the Treaty of Rome which remains 
still the legal basis of what is now the EU but was then known as the Common 
Market.[10] Legal summaries of the terrain this Treaty has now spread into are 
provided by the European Commission.
6
 Back in the 1950s, food and farming were 
major concerns in mainstream politicians’ minds. Europe had emerged from a 
devastating war, characterised by death and food disruption. Rationing had been 
common (based upon novel nutrition insights). In the UK, technically a victor, old 
Empire-based supply chains had been exposed as strategically vulnerable and failing 
to serve all its citizens well. Respected critics had prophesied that these weaknesses 
were already exposed in the 1930s.[11-13] Certainly, in World War 2, the UK 
learned fast that it needed to produce more food itself and ensure it was fairly 
distributed.[14, 15] It learned the cost of wasting food and taking the short-term 
view that cheapness is the only important goal in food policy. Security, quality, 
distribution and equality matter, too.[16, 17]  
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6	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
After the war, food concerns were a significant feature in planning the 
reconstruction: supporting farmers from booms and slumps, making more good 
food affordable for working people, creating new institutional structures at home, in 
Europe and globally, and setting up welfare systems to prevent 1930s-style 
hunger.[18, 19]  Policy makers knew that the food system was not a hermetically 
sealed system; it both reflected and affected other elements in the political 
economy. Hunger in the 1930s had not been helped by the Wall Street Crash, the 
global recession and the unemployment that followed.[20, 21] In the UK, these 
considerations featured as it too reconstructed after the war. Enormous attention 
went into preventing what is now called ‘food insecurity’ globally and nationally.[21, 
22] The welfare system was to provide a safety net which included the cost of a 
decent diet.[23] New schemes such as the NHS and school meals were 
developed.[24-26]  Farm support and marketing schemes were expanded. The 
Agriculture Act 1947 was passed to give a policy infrastructure to prevent a 1930s 
style farm recession.[27] This, it was hoped, would prevent the UK food supply being 
exposed as it had been in the recent war.[28]  
This kind of policy development was common across Europe and the Western world. 
It began to be prepared and planned even in the war.[29, 30] This is the context out 
of which the European Union emerged. The political intent was to put the centuries 
of European tension – economic, political, military – behind us. The UK was actively 
involved in creating this new Europe. Even then some of the tensions we see today 
were already apparent not just in the UK but across Europe: the politics of free trade 
versus managed markets, the Atlanticists versus nationalists or nascent Europeans. 
3.	 What	is	the	point	of	the	EU:	peace,	progress	and	food	security?	
The British are right to ask: ‘what is the purpose of the EU?’ Whatever the views 
today, two original motives should be acknowledged: it was to build a peaceful 
Europe, and better mechanisms than war and economic dislocation in managing the 
political economy. Food was a key strand within these, fuelled by commitment to 
end the folly of hunger and distorted markets that had characterised the 1930s. 
Public health analysts had documented how poor health due was due to low income 
and unemployment.[31] They joined the calls to replace them through strategic and 
economic security, cross-border collaboration, solidarity, and the reframing of 
capitalism itself. The goal was peace through prosperity.  
It is not sentimental to remind ourselves of these motives. The EU has been poor at 
rebutting anti-EU ribaldry. Its association with ‘bent bananas’, ‘food mountains’, 
‘wine lakes’, etc., bring cynicism and forgetfulness. Sometimes the criticisms have 
been deserved: there was stupid over-production and surplus dumping in the 1980s, 
as Conservative MP Sir Richard Body (and others) pointed out.[32] It is no excuse to 
state that the EU was not alone in this practice; the USA dumped too.[33] Like any 
vast international engagement, the EU may lose its way at times – one can argue it 
currently suffers just such a loss of purpose - and it may irritate this or that faction. 
But we should not forget that the intent was to create peaceful collaboration rather 
than wars as a way of resolving conflicts over issues like food.  
In some respects, the EU deserves credit for its food and farming policy; this has 
contributed to the food peace in the form of cheaper raw ingredients and security 
of supply for the urban majority. But it has also seeded great discontent such as 
over the dumping of surpluses in the developing world (now, if not halted, certainly 
notionally being addressed), the creation of cheap commodities for a food industry 
which over-produces possibly too cheaply,
7
 and nutritionally impoverished 
processed foods. It has also deliberately haemorrhaged farm employment. Dr Sicco 
Mansholt, architect of the CAP and its first Commissioner, understood the tendency 
to overproduction, and he introduced measures in the 1960s (watered down but 
agreed in 1972) to reduce the numbers of farmers.[34] His and the CAP’s goal was 
to maintain farmer incomes, not necessarily farmer numbers.  This labour-shedding 
from the land has continued. In 2000-12, an estimated 4.8 million ‘agricultural 
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 For food industries pursuing value-adding, such cheap commodities are a benefit, of course. 
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7	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
worker units’ (i.e. full-time equivalents) disappeared in Europe.[35] Such policies 
have been created often in the name of the conventional economic goals of 
competitiveness and market efficiency. On the one hand, the EU has given an 
emphasis to consumer interests. On the other hand, it is frequently criticised as 
answering the needs of Big rather than Small food businesses. On one feature, there 
is agreement. The EU is a multi-state collaboration. Some like this. Others don’t.  
After the Common Market began in 1957 with its six founding member states, very 
quickly others wanted to join. In 1961, the UK, Denmark, Ireland and Norway 
requested to join what was essentially a customs union.  The UK was rebuffed by 
France’s President De Gaulle fearing that the UK would be an agent of US foreign 
policy interests (this was the Cold War and he wanted to preserve French military 
autonomy). Only when Georges Pompidou, like De Gaulle a Conservative, became 
French President did negotiations on the UK and others joining begin properly. The 
UK joined fully in 1973 and began to collaborate in the development of European 
food and farming policy.[36, 37] A UK election followed in 1974, won by Labour 
which had promised a Referendum, as the Conservatives had in 2015. This was held 
in 1975, with the vote to remain a resounding 67% in favour. 
4.	 Food	in	EU	Policy	
Over the 43 years of membership, the panoply of EU policies (in which the UK has 
participated and which it has both helped create and implement) has become an 
increasingly broad framework for food. This now ranges beyond the farm gate and 
includes:  
• The Common Fisheries Policy as well as the Common Agricultural Policy 
• Intra-EU food trade regulations  
• Competition policy  
• Transport infrastructure support for roads, rail, waterways etc., plus regulations 
on issues such as wagon load capacity and driver working time 
• Subsidy and common finance to fund not just farming but off-farm food activity 
and marketing 
• Food standards on daily matters such as sizes, weights and composition 
• Designation of food identification and locality 
• Food safety regulations and infrastructure 
• Consumer protection legislation such as food information and nutrition labelling 
• Worker health and safety, and working time regulations to prevent worker 
exploitation 
• Free movement of labour within the EU (to parallel the free movement of capital 
and commodities) 
• Scientific and Technological Research and Development  
• Rural development 
• Rules for public procurement and local sourcing 
• Public health advice and education 
• Nutrition labelling and restrictions on health claims in food 
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8	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
• Environmental protection ranging from biodiversity to forestry and air quality 
• Sustainable consumption and production policy development such as the recent 
Circular Economy communiqué 
• Waste guidance and control  
• Water and river quality control 
Table 1 gives some key moments in the evolution of this broad conception of Food 
Policy at the European level. It is conventional for European histories to focus on 
agriculture and the CAP but this table broadens the policy net to include the large 
amount of work beyond the farm gate. 
 
Table	1:	Some	moments	in	UK-EU	food	policy	development	
Date	 Event	 Significance	
1951 European Coal & Steel 
arrangement 
Signed in Paris by 6 founding countries. It began the 
process of collaboration which became forerunner of other 
commercial treaties, particularly the Treaty of Rome.
8
 
1957 Treaty of Rome The founding agreement of what is now the EU. Signed by 
6 countries: France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux three: 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg [10] Article 39 
promised to “increase production by promoting technical 
progress.” 
1958 Stresa Conference sets up the 
Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) 
This conference explored the core thinking and 
mechanisms behind the CAP: security of supply, farm 
support, structural and price policies without 
distortions.[38] 
1969 UK begins to join the EEC After being rebuffed a few years earlier, the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark began the negotiation to join 
1970  First rules for a Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP)  
This began to articulate fisheries policy within the CAP. 
1973  UK joins the European Economic 
Community (EEC) 
After ambivalence, the UK joins, led by PM Edward Heath. 
1975 UK referendum Promised by PM Harold Wilson. 67% of UK voters voted to 
stay in the EEC.
9
 
1986 Mrs Thatcher signs the Single 
Market legislation 
The ‘1992’ process from 1987-92 created the Single Market 
which became operational in 1992.[39] The food industry 
was expected to be a major beneficiary.[40] 
1992 Maastricht Treaty This introduces the ‘subsidiarity’ principle, that decisions 
should be devolved to the appropriate level, a highpoint in 
the counter tension to perceived policy centralisation. 
1992  McSharry CAP reform This was a major reform package,
10
 aiming to reduce price 
support. Compulsory set-aside introduced. Agri-
environment support began (known as ‘Pillar 2’).  
1993 Common Fisheries Policy 
becomes separate from CAP 
The Financial Instrument for Fisheries was established as a 
separate EU fund. 
1994 New General Agreement on 
Tariffs & Trade (GATT) signed at 
Marrakech 
EU and Member States agree agriculture and food 
standards come under newly created World Trade 
Organisation and side agreements on food safety,
11
 plus 
agriculture.
12
 
1998  QUID labels QUID = quantitative ingredient declaration. The result of 
																																								 																					
8
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:xy0022  
9
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/6/newsid_2499000/2499297.stm  
10
 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/1992-reform/index_en.htm  
11
 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm  
12
 https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14-ag_01_e.htm  
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9	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
nearly 20 years of negotiation to provide consumers with 
more realistic food labels. 
2000  EU Food Safety White Paper The final response by the EU to the rolling food safety crisis 
in which the UK’s contributions were plentiful: BSE (mad 
cow disease), pesticide scandals, hormone irregularities, 
salmonella. Introduces a risk-based management approach. 
Created the European Food Safety Authority to harmonise 
food safety. 
2000  Agenda 2000 Created a comprehensive rural development package.
13
 
Rural Development is now an important part of EU/UK 
thinking about food infrastructure, marketing and 
employment.  
2002 European Food Safety Authority 
created 
Result of the realisation that, if food crosses borders, safety 
measures need to be improved.
14
 Responsibility lies with 
each link in the food chain. Traceability becomes a key goal. 
This was useful in exposing the 2013 horsemeat fraud.[41] 
2006  Regulation of Nutrition and 
Health Claims 
This stopped misleading food claims and created a 
standard system of nutrient labelling, long sought by 
consumer and health professions and NGOs.[42] 
2010 CAP Towards 2020  This document began the latest of many rounds of CAP 
reform. It committed the EU to move towards more 
sustainable but competitive agriculture.
15
 The final 
agreement was in 2013. 
2011 Roadmap to a resource-efficient 
Europe 
Signals food as a key issue for both consumption and 
production which needs to have reduced impacts, notably 
on greenhouse gas and other environmental effects.
16
 
2014ff TTIP negotiations Present UK Government strongly supports EU preparing 
treaty with USA to liberalise and harmonise trade. 
Negotiations have been criticized as conducted largely in 
secret and are hotly questioned by European (including UK) 
and US civil society. 
2015 Circular Economy package  This commits the EU to a range of improvements affecting 
food: waste reduction, water recycling, material and plastic 
reduction and reuse, marine litter reduction.[43] 
	
Over the 43 years of membership, the panoply of EU policies (in which the UK has 
participated and which it has both helped create and implement) has become an 
increasingly broad framework for food. Critics in the Brexit debate see this 
development as nothing but the creation of a bloated bureaucracy, the triumph of 
‘Eurocrats’. In 2015, the EU population was 508 million people.
17
 The EU 28 member 
states combine as the largest economic area in the world, by value.
18
 In fact its 
bureaucracy is slight for such a vast population and economic might. The European 
Commission employed precisely 32,966 people in 2015.
19
  By comparison, the UK 
had 327,696 civil servants, over ten times more.[44]
20
  Whereas Defra employs 
7,600, the Directorate General (DG) Agriculture and Rural Development employs 
1,000.
21
 So it is perhaps misleading to portray the Commission as a bloated 
bureaucracy.  
Given this enormous presence of food in EU politics, as Table 1 showed, the 
																																								 																					
13
 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/agenda-2000/index_en.htm  
14
 http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/aboutefsa  
15
 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/post-2013/index_en.htm  
16
 http://ec.europa.eu/resource-efficient-europe/pdf/resource_efficient_europe_en.pdf  
17
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tab
leSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1  
18
 See the EU statistics website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en  
19
 http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/hr_key_figures_2016.pdf  
20
 ONS Civil Service statistics 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/publicsectorpersonne
l/bulletins/civilservicestatistics/2015-10-08  
21
 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/agriculture/index_en.htm	 
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10	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
significance of the Brexit debate is self-evident. Strangely, in the run-up to the 
Cameron deal and announcement of the Referendum, there was an eerie silence 
about food, when the modern food system is not just a matter of farming. The UK 
was a cheer-leader for the Single Food Market. It has championed interests off the 
land more than farming. It has favoured the ‘marketisation’ of food policy – lowering 
social and public policy goals in favour of market rules – and the inclusion of big 
food businesses in many an EU Roundtable or policy development process. And the 
UK Food Manufacturing sector is largely pro the EU.
22
 Food Business has been 
guarded even since the Referendum ‘gloves’ came off, and many organisations are 
keeping neutral, arguing their membership covers a wide range of views. 
The UK’s own data shows how money flows through the food system. Figure 1 is 
from the annual Defra Agricultural statistics report which gives an overview of the 
UK food system using a combination of 2013 and 2014 data.[45] It shows a lengthy 
food supply chain with uneven distribution of work, gross value added (GVA), 
number of enterprises and share of where consumer expenditure goes, by sector.
23
 
In summary: 
• 64 million consumers spent £198 bn on food in the year. 
• £112 bn was in retail outlets and £86 bn in food service (i.e. eating outside the 
home). 
• Catering is now fast catching the retail sector in gross value added (GVA). It had 
£26.9bn GVA in 2014 compared to retailing’s £29.1bn. 
• Farming’s GVA was a comparatively small £9.9bn. Wholesaling had a higher GVA 
of £10.1 bn. 
• Farming had 476,000 employees, compared to food manufacturing’s 409,000, 
retailing’s 1,184,000 and catering’s 1,641,000.   
• Britain, an island, employed just 6,000 employees in fishing with a GVA of just 
£574 m.
24
 Most fish caught by British fishing is exported to the EU.	
 
While farming still accounts for a large percentage of the EU budget, it is down from 
just over 70% in 1980 to 40% in 2013.  The CAP budget has risen, measured at 2011 
constant prices, from €20 bn in 1980 to around €55 bn by 2013 (see Figure 2) – 
mainly due to EU membership rising from 12 to 28 countries.[46] Agriculture 
actually accounts for only 1.4% of economic activity in the EU. The OECD Agricultural 
Monitoring and Evaluation Report confirms that EU farm support has been 
dramatically reduced between 1995-97 and 2012-14.[47] Only New Zealand has 
gone ‘cold turkey’; it reduced its subsidies to nigh zero in one fell swoop in the early 
1980s, winning praise from neo-liberals and mainstream economics for this 
dramatic ending of subsidies.[48] 
 
 
																																								 																					
22
 To its credit, the Food and Drink Federation was one of the only food trade bodies which 
was prepared to engage in discussions about the food implications of Brexit long before Mr 
Cameron’s British Settlement had been concluded. See speech by Ian Wright, DG of the 
FDG at the 6
th
 City Food Symposium (footnote 1 earlier). The other was the National 
Farmers Union. http://foodresearch.org.uk/food-symposium-at-city-university-london/  
23
 The food sector is not unusual in such uneven distribution of work, value and reward; it 
reflects a general shift towards development at the service ‘end’ of the system.  
24
 The House of Commons Library estimate differs, stating 12,000 in employment. 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN02788/SN02788.pdf  All agree 
the numbers and fish catch have dropped significantly since World War 2.  
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Figure	1:	Economic	Summary	of	the	UK	Food	Chain,	2014	
	
	
Source: Defra 2015 pg 91 [45] 
 
The founding European member states’ goal was to prevent famines such as had 
disfigured the Netherlands in 1944 (which ironically created a ‘natural experiment’ 
of long-term effects on Dutch public health, still measured
25
).  It is not surprising 
that the Common Market founders set out to build farm support and to use land to 
feed people. In this it is not alone. The USA also has a long-term farm support 
system, the Farm Bill,
26
 much fought over like the CAP.  Today’s EU has 40% of its 
land as agricultural. The UK has 71% of its land designated as agricultural land use 
but only a third of that is ‘croppable’.[45] Only 164,000 hectares are used for 
horticulture (fruit and vegetables) out of 4,722,000 hectares down to crops. Half of 
																																								 																					
25
 http://www.hongerwinter.nl/item.php?id=32&language=EN  
26
 http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=farmbill  
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12	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
that total cropping area grows cereals, about half of which are fed to animals – a 
land use now much criticised as fuelling farming’s high carbon emissions.[49] 
Animals are slow and poor energy converters (although they vary), and most 
academic thinking is that meat and dairy consumption ideally should come down, 
thereby giving a double ‘win’ to health and climate change targets.[50-52]		
Figure	2:	CAP	expenditure	in	the	EU	budget	(at	2011	constant	prices)	
	
Source: CAP Post 2013 (2015) 
Although the drift of subsidies and benefits is downwards, the debates are by no 
means over. An interesting strand of work has been conducted over the last decade 
by independent researchers into which companies and private interests have 
actually benefited from EU subsidies. EU olive industry subsidies rose, for example, 
from €160m in 1975 to €2.3bn between 1998-2003.[53]  Table 2 gives the 
cumulative EU subsidies received by the top 30 recipients across the period 1997- 
2012.
27
 These are large sums going from consumers to and through corporate 
interests. In theory, all CAP market support has to be paid through processors, who 
then in principle pay this to their farmer suppliers. More independent research work 
is needed on how the money actually flows and where it ends. Defra’s system 
picture (Figure 1 above) suggests that, in the UK at least, powerful off-land sectors 
are doing rather well in this transfer. The work of the UK’s Grocery Code Adjudicator 
is proving useful in lifting the lid on intra-chain dynamics.[54] Our point here is that 
more open and accurate analyses are needed before accusing farmers of being ‘EU 
feather-bedded’. In reality, much money is made out of food, not much by farmers, 
many of whom are kept in existence by subsidies, but work long hours for low 
returns; they would not survive without the subsidy. The debate about what land is 
for ought to be central in national and international policy.
28
 Meanwhile farm size 
has inexorably risen and the number of enterprises fallen across the world not just 
in the EU or UK. The ‘In or Out’ Referendum should be a moment when the UK 
debates who gets the money from the £198 bn consumers spend on food in a year, 
and what we want from the land. 
																																								 																					
27
 These are cumulative sums from 1997 to 2013, though not all entities received subsidies in 
all years.  Some companies are listed twice, receiving subsidies in different locations. 
Details are viewable online, by clicking on each company name: 
http://farmsubsidy.openspending.org/EU/ [accessed March 3, 2016].	
28
 See the Square Meal report: http://foodresearch.org.uk/square-meal/  
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13	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
If the June 23 referendum is to be a defining vote about the realities of the EU, food 
not just agriculture must be a debating hot-spot. The British people should not 
sleep-walk into something with potentially great effect on daily lives. 
Table	2:	EU	subsidies,	top	30	recipients	(all	countries,	1997	to	2013,	in	€)	
	 	 Name		 	 	 	 	 Amount	(all	years)	
1.  Varios Beneficiarios €641,532,359 
2.  Tate & Lyle Europe (031583) €594,270,084 
3.  Avebe B.A. €433,774,989 
4.  Tereos €355,862,808 
5.  Saint Louis Sucre €287,490,301 
6.  Campina Melkunie Veghel €260,114,283 
7.  Doux €223,214,655 
8.  SC Fondul De Garantare A Creditului Rural - IFN SA €220,000,000 
9.  Nestlé Nederland BV €193,279,415 
10.  Corman SA €184,690,194 
11.  Tate & Lyle Europe €170,957,385 
12.  Tiense Suikerraff. Raff. Tirlemontoise NV SA  €164,941,364 
13.  Hoogwegt International BV €161,601,809 
14.  Navobi B.V. €151,243,294 
15.  Corman SA  €149,455,603 
16.  Junta De Andalucia €145,619,981 
17.  Italia Zuccheri Spa €139,754,719 
18.  Krajowa Spółka Cukrowa Spółka Akcyjna €138,806,128 
19.  Tiense Suikerraff. Raff. Tirlemontoise NV SA €137,647,553 
20.  Hoogwegt International BV  €134,051,911 
21.  Meadow Foods Ltd €127,223,714 
22.  Eridania Sadam Spa €125,262,919 
23.  Azucarera Ebro, S. L. €119,445,484 
24.  Nestlé  Nederland BV €118,548,842 
25.  CSM Suiker B.V. €118,406,046 
26.  Cristal Union €114,464,451 
27.  Friesland Coberco Butter Products €109,066,782 
28.  F.In.A.F. First Internetional Association Fruit Soc. Consortile A R.L. €108,383,082 
29.  Edia - Empresa De Desenvolvimento E Infra-Estruturas Do Alqueva S.A. €103,095,249 
30.  Landesumweltamt Brandenburg €102,919,992 
 
Source: farmsubsidy.org, 2014[55] 
 
5.	 Which	Ministries	lead	on	food	matters	relevant	to	Brexit?	
The Referendum is a policy action with serious consequences as well as purpose. At 
the time of writing, the debate has been mostly ideological, perhaps inevitably so. It 
deserves more detail, however. Specific questions might be posed to those 
responsible for different aspects of the food system which could be affected by the 
vote. Table 3 lists some leading Ministries / Departments of State, the name of the 
Cabinet member (and HM Opposition in brackets) with such responsibilities, and 
comments as to why this role matters for the food implications of Brexit or Bremain.  
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14	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
Table	3:	UK	Cabinet	Ministries	with	a	role	on	Food	and	Brexit	
Ministry UK Cabinet 
member 
[HM Opposition in 
brackets] 
Relevance to Food and Brexit 
Department for 
Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs 
(Defra)  
Liz Truss 
[Kerry McCarthy] 
Defra has a key role in shaping policy on food and farming’s production and 
environmental impacts. The key connection point to EU on CAP and policy 
developments such as Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP), and a 
key delivery agency for the UK’s agreement of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals 2015-30. 
Department of 
Health (DH) 
 
Jeremy Hunt 
[Heidi Alexander] 
DH seeks an improvement in national diet to reduce food’s negative effects 
on public health and nutrition, and to reduce diet’s burden on the NHS 
budget. 
International 
Development (DfID) 
Justine Greening 
[Diane Abbott] 
DfID has a big budget and role in international policy and delivery of food 
aid; it is also a champion of food and nutrition security, through 
programmes such as Nutrition for Growth and Scaling up Nutrition.
29
 
Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC) 
Amber Rudd 
[Lisa Nandy] 
DECC knows that food is a major source of climate change. The 20
th
 
century’s massive increase in food production was largely associated with oil 
(for fertilisers). N fertilizer is made mainly from natural gas Consumer eating 
patterns are already being affected ‘below the radar’ by reformulation and 
carbon reduction but further big change is needed to meet UN and EU 
climate targets after the 2015 Paris Accord,[56] unless the UK tears up all 
such agreements following Brexit. The EU has committed to reduce GHGs by 
40% on 1990 levels by 2030. This requires food change. 
H M Treasury 
(HMT) 
George Osborne 
[John McDonnell] 
HMT is a long-term critic of CAP.[57] The long-term drop in food prices has 
been a key factor freeing domestic expenditure for other goods. HMT wants 
more cuts in CAP funding, and is concerned about world price volatility since 
the banking crisis of 2007-09. Yet Brexit could destabilize prices, already 
volatile at the international level. 
Business, 
Innovation and 
Skills (BIS) 
 
Sajid Javid 
[Angela Eagle] 
BIS hosts the Chief Scientist and champions the science budget and R&D for 
which the UK is famous. UK Universities are big beneficiaries of EU R&D and 
science programmes. BIS also champions skills. The food sector is partly high 
and partly low skill. The UK food system employs 3.5 million people. Food 
manufacturing is now the largest manufacturing sector in the UK.[58] 
Culture Media and 
Sport (DCMS) 
John Whittingdale 
[Maria Eagle]  
DCMS has been a key player in two hot issues in food policy: advertising and 
sponsorship, and physical activity.  
Education (and 
Women) (DfE) 
Nicky Morgan 
[Lucy Powell] 
DfE has been a hot-spot of food policy activity over cooking skills and school 
food. In 2016, DfE ended its financial support of the School Food Plan, 
although it has a commitment to many aspects of delivery including 
Universal Infant Free School Meals.  
Employment – part 
of the Department 
for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) 
Priti Patel 
[Owen Smith] 
DWP is responsible for employment, unemployment and youth 
employment. On food, it has taken a low key role. Its focus on lowering 
unemployment begs questions about wages: what is the balance of ‘McJobs’ 
(low pay, low skills) versus high status and well remunerated job growth? 
The Right wants to end the EU Working Time directive. The Living Wage 
Campaign wants to make every job sufficient to live sustainably.  
Scotland  David Mundell 
[Ian Munday] 
Since the Scottish Government was given more autonomy by the Labour 
Government, Scotland has pioneered its own policy and priorities in food 
policy, emphasizing sustainability.[59] Responsibility for this lies not with the 
Secretary of State, listed here, but the Scottish Minister, Richard Lochhead 
MSP. [60] 
Wales  Stephen Crabb 
[Nia Griffith] 
Wales, like Scotland, has developed its own distinctive policy package, not 
least a rural and export focus.[61] It has a Welsh Food Strategy and Action 
Plan.[62] Like Scotland, the Welsh Government has a broadening interest in 
food policy.[63, 64] Rebecca Evans AM is Deputy Minister for Farming and 
Food. 
 
Source: authors 
																																								 																					
29
 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nutrition-for-growth-2-years-on  
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Particular attention in the mix above should surely be given to Defra. A new 25 Year 
Strategy has been in preparation at Defra since 2015 and is due for publication after 
this Briefing. Although the UK is now a devolved system of governance, the ‘English’ 
minister often has considerable overview, not least representation, at the EU level. 
Asked at the Oxford Farming Conference in January 2016 about her thoughts on the 
implications of a possible Brexit, Elizabeth Truss, Secretary of State at Defra said “it 
was not the case” that Defra officials were preparing alternatives, should the UK 
vote to leave the UK.[65] This was widely headlined in the press as ‘there is no Plan 
B’. But that official line cracked when Ms Truss’ junior Minister, George Eustice, 
stated on February 25 that such work is going on and that he favours a situation 
where “we took back control of agricultural policy”.[66]   
If the people vote to leave, on June 24, what happens?  We know that in some 
political circles, ‘planning’ is considered bad faith, yet this surely is an occasion when 
the British public might want its leaders to prepare for eventualities. If we vote to 
leave, 43 years of treaties, policy negotiations, shared frameworks, commercial 
‘level playing fields’ and economic engagement will be thrown into question. If there 
is a Brexit, the retreat should at least be orderly. And what about the advance to 
replace it? Where would the UK food system be pointed? 
This all matters because: 
• the food system is now so finely attuned to ‘just-in-time’ systems that any 
disruptions could be serious. Resilience planning in the mid 2000s suggested the UK 
food system was food secure, if parts of it were ‘hit’.[67] But Brexit is the entire food 
system being affected not just one part or one Regional Distribution Centre or one 
company or one food line.  
• UK food has become woven into intra-European food networks; we buy 
food produced, processed and distributed across Europe and shop in non UK-owned 
shops (e.g. Aldi, Lidl, Netto). 
• European fresh food products now underpin UK access to fresh food; we 
import huge amounts of seasonal fruit and vegetables we don’t grow here. Some of 
these could be grown here. Why does the UK import apples or pears, for example, 
which could be grown sustainably here? Some fresh produce could not, e.g. 
pineapples or mangoes. There is a mix of changed consumer tastes but also of 
underinvestment and market and policy failure in UK horticulture.
30
 
• EU labour underpins much of the growth of both ‘on-farm’ as seasonal 
workers and ‘off-farm’ especially in food service. 
• Democratic processes between EU member states have provided 
minimum safety standards for UK food supplies; if food crosses borders (and it has 
for centuries at scale), the EU provides a democratically accountable system of 
checks and balances to inspect and audit.  
• UK food tastes have ‘europeanised’; we don’t just get fresh fruit from 
within Europe, our food culture has been altered, diversified and softened; we are 
now a café society; wine-drinking permeates all classes and most age groups; 
continental holidays and leisure are woven into ordinary life; celebrity chefs 
encourage us to drink and cook with olive oil. 
 
To its credit, the farming sector was quick to explore the enormity of Brexit after the 
May 2015 election meant that a referendum was almost certain. Three Professors of 
Agricultural Economics, Alan Swinbank, Alan Matthews and most recently Allan 
Buckwell have explored possible implications.[68-70]  Two papers have been written 
for farmer organisations, that by Prof Buckwell, and another compilation led by Prof 
Wyn Grant, a political scientist with a long record on the politics of CAP.[71] Both 
																																								 																					
30	A paper on horticulture is to be published by the Food Research Collaboration which 
explores such issues. 
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16	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
have led to a process of rural and farmer meetings. There ought to be urban ones, 
too.  
 
Work is in progress from within the environmental movement reviewing the EU’s 
generally (though not entirely) positive role in environmental protection.[72] 
Environmentalists are aware that, for all its faults, the EU processes are at least fairly 
open, and amenable to public pressure,
31
 as happened when celebrity chef Hugh 
Fearnley-Whittingstall helped a pan EU civil society campaign to urge the European 
Commission to stop the practice of ‘discarding’ perfectly usable fish.[73] In three 
years, Common Fisheries Policy was changed.
32
 The Sea as both shared and national 
‘space’ has been fiercely fought over commercially. The CFP has not been a huge 
success but is at last coming under some proper external scrutiny. The UK retains 
the second largest EU fleet. After gross overfishing for decades, there has been a 
long term drop in catch since the mid 20
th
 century.[74]  The UK is now a net 
importer of fish and has a fish trade gap of between 200,000 and 300,000 tonnes 
annually in recent years.[75] 
The public health and civil society food movements have been somewhat slow to 
engage with the Referendum, partly concerned about whether the new legal 
constraints on lobbying might be invoked; but this is a Referendum not an 
election.
33
 Many commercial sectors, spokespeople and pundits have also been 
reluctant to speak about Food and Brexit. It was partly to explore this anticipated 
gap that the Food Research Collaboration and the Centre for Food Policy hosted the 
6
th
 City Food Symposium in December 2015.
34
  This Briefing Paper takes that process 
a stage further. 
 
6.	 The	current	food	policy	challenge:	sustainability	or	bust?	
One of the unintended but positive outcomes of the banking and commodity crisis 
of 2007-08 was that the rich developed world had to face the fragility of its – not 
just the developing world’s - food systems. Palpable concern spread through 
governmental circles used to seeing Africa or Asia as having the food problems. 
Rocketing oil and commodity prices generated attention on food matters not seen 
since the 1970s oil and famine crises. Then, as now, the reflex was to address the 
Malthusian conceptualisation of under-consumption, hunger and population by the 
simple solution of aiming to produce more food. Produce more – unleashing science 
and technology, coupled with more efficient market mechanisms – and problems 
will be resolved. This time in the 2000s, that policy formula (elsewhere termed the 
‘Productionist Paradigm’) was clearly not adequate, although it has not stopped 
some from espousing it.[76]  
 
Since the 1970s a mountain of evidence has accumulated that the food system is 
centrally involved in reshaping the planet, public health and how people live. 
Western Governments, shocked into seeing their own exposure when world food 
prices doubled in the banking crisis 2007-09, received a mini-avalanche of official 
reviews of the situation. These came from the World Bank, the UN, and individual 
governments.[77-81] They all summarised data on the mismatch of current food 
supply with demand. They did not, however, retreat simply to the old policy recipe 
of ‘produce more’; that might be necessary but only if accompanied by radical shifts 
to sustainability to prevent the impact of current food trends on the economy, 
health, environment and social justice.[82-84] Academics and scientists point to a 
situation never experienced in human history. This ‘new complexity’ analysis is that 
food is associated with or a cause of or at risk from: 
																																								 																					
31	e.g. Friends of the Earth: https://www.foe.co.uk/page/eu-referendum-reports  
32
 http://www.fishfight.net/story.html  
33
 A health portal has been launched: http://healthierin.eu/  
34
 The 2015 City Food Symposium on UK, Food and Europe: implications of Brexit (held on 
December 14, 2015; see presentations: http://foodresearch.org.uk/food-symposium-at-
city-university-london/ ) 
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• climate change and pressures on land use, in which dietary change means higher 
carbon diets.[52, 85] 
 
• pressure on planetary boundaries and self-regulatory ecosystems such as the 
nitrogen cycle.[86, 87] 
 
• Significant effects on ecosystems services, the ‘infrastructure’ of life itself, loss of 
biodiversity, rising use and misuse of potable water.[88-90] 
 
• Massive public health problems associated with mal-consumption and excess 
availability of ultra-processed foods;[91, 92]  
 
• Persistent hunger and mal-distribution, not helped by failures to invest in food 
infrastructure.[93]  
 
• Mass scale use of grains for meat and dairy production on an industrial scale with 
health and environmental consequences.[94, 95] 
 
• The creation of a food culture of plenty, whose expectations of untrammelled 
choice shape new demands, fuelled by unprecedented marketing and cultural 
investment; these distort children’s eating patterns.[96, 97]  
 
• A global nutrition transition creating new patterns of disease and costs to 
healthcare.[98, 99]  
 
Governments and commerce have found this new complex analysis hard to address. 
It means questioning the productionist paradigm. It requires inter-agency, 
international action. It suggests the need for multi-level food system recalibration 
which ought to be led by intergovernmental action. This is why one now sees 
conservation organisations troubled by diet – because biodiversity is being 
destroyed by food production.[100] And why health analysts see the urgent case for 
protecting ecosystems – because trends damaging health also affect the capacity of 
earth systems to operate within safe boundaries.[89] And why so much of the food 
industry is now concerned about climate change. It needs a new level playing field. 
 
The EU has begun to engage with some of this, sometimes falteringly, held back by 
reluctance to intervene firmly, and by conventional belief in minimal government. 
This hesitancy was exhibited when a long negotiated and anticipated Sustainable 
Food Communiqué awaiting formal acceptance was dropped by the incoming 
Commission in summer 2014 – in the name of jobs and growth, as though those are 
unconnected with sustainability and health! Yet the EU’s own Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) has been a source of clear evidence suggesting the need for major dietary 
change, with estimates that food accounts for around a third of the average 
European’s impact on climate change.[101, 102]  UK governments, too, have long 
received strong recommendations from its own advisors to begin to shift the food 
system, and not just appeal to consumers to ‘do the right thing’.[103, 104]  
 
This is the ‘big picture’ that the UK, like all rich societies, needs to address. The 2015 
Paris Climate Change Accord and the signing of the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals both suggest that the present Government is aware of how pressing this is. 
Food sits at the centre of this case for change. This is what our politicians and policy 
makers ought to focus on. This is what the EU vote and its ramifications on policy 
mechanism will shape.  
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7.	 Conclusions	to	Part	1	
1. EU role in food has been developing since 1957 with the UK joining in 1973. 43 
years of interaction and working together on food matters is at stake if the UK 
votes to leave.  
 
2. The UK Food System is more than just farming; it is now a highly complex off-
farm system which is closely woven into continental (and therefore EU) 
structures. Most money, employment and value adding occurs off the land.  
 
3. The pressing food policy agenda is how to make the entire Food System more 
sustainable, and to begin that process rapidly. Whether in or out, we need to 
shift the UK towards dietary health, to reduce the UK food system’s carbon 
footprint, and to prevent the massive externalised health costs associated with 
poor diet. Food can and should be a positive feature of UK culture not a major 
source of damage to eco-systems, lives and health.  
 
4. Unless the UK chose an autarkic policy position – feeding itself solely from 
within its own borders – some inter-governmental and inter-corporate food 
relations and structures are inevitable. This is what the EU has developed.  
 
5. If the UK votes for Brexit, urgent thought needs to be given to the question: 
replaced by what? How? By and with whom? 
It is to the latter questions we now turn. 
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PART	2:	IMPLICATIONS	OF	THE	REFERENDUM	VOTE	
 
8.	 What	happens	on	June	24?	
This section now considers some features of the food policy landscape which are at 
stake in the Referendum. When UK citizens vote on 23 June for Britain to remain in 
the EU (Bremain) or to leave (Brexit), the food policy direction will be determined.  
8.1		 At	stake	1:	A	framework	of	policies	and	processes		
Simply put, since 1973, and particularly since the Single Market and ‘1992’ process 
introduced under Mrs Thatcher, the UK’s food system has become inextricably 
entwined with other EU member states. To unravel this would be complex and take 
time. Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union would have to be invoked; this 
is the agreed formal process.[105] Current prognoses suggest this process would 
take at the minimum two years but probably, in the case of food, far longer. The 
modern world of food is not just a matter of formal legal standards and regulations 
but of a vast parallel system of commercial ones. This dual system of food 
governance – much analysed by academics[106] – would be changed by the 
significant alterations and uncertainties for the formal legal system that would 
follow from a governmental withdrawal from the EU.  
Membership of the EU has meant participation in the development of what is now a 
complex web of processes of decision-making. The style is of compromise, which is 
why the EU was given the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for “the advancement of peace 
and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe”.[107] Behind and before 
every high profile, late night ministerial meeting, is an often long slog of 
consultation and preparation involving civil servants, policy-makers, industry, 
consumers and evidence providers. A vast array of agreements, policies and 
standards now underpin UK food. Labels are in EU formats. This did not just happen. 
It was negotiated. Nutrition labelling didn’t just spontaneously appear; it took the 
consumer and public health movements nearly 20 years of lobbying, researching, 
trialling and educating to achieve what we now have; and it is constantly tussled 
over. This vast array of agreements is hard for UK or any voters to see. It’s the reality 
we accept as, well, ‘reality’! In formal EU language, this is known as the acquis 
communautaire. This is what any new applicant to the EU has to negotiate and re-
engineer into its food and wider political economy. This is what Brexit would leave. 
The acquis is the compilation or accumulation over time of legislation and court 
decisions which make up the body of European Union law.[108] Table 4 gives the 
chapter headings of the current acquis. This is what any state accedes to when 
joining the EU, and what the UK leaves if it votes Brexit. One way forward would be 
to retain the acquis and whittle away what was not desired over time.
 35
 This sounds 
attractive but the problem is that at the same time, on the wider scale, a process of 
negotiation would begin affecting the parallel system of commercial governance. It 
would be necessary to differentiate between laws setting the relationship between 
member states, such as free movement and public procurement, and EU directives 
that have been transposed into UK law, such as most of the environmental, 
consumer protection and health regulations in chapters 27 and 28 (see Table 4). 
Whether the UK chooses to keep, for example the Special Protection Areas or 
regulations on water quality, could be up to the Government. This anticipates a 
huge amount of time and energy given to such discussions. It means revisiting 43 
years of what has already been decided in a kind of food policy groundhog day. This 
negotiation and sifting would have to reshape or reaffirm the legal basis of internal, 
trade and external frameworks.  
																																								 																					
35
 At the June 2014 AGM of the Campaign to Protect Rural England, Nigel Farage MEP, leader 
of the UK Independence Party, was asked what would happen if the UK left the EU. His 
answer was to leave it all in place and then over time decide what to keep, what to 
enhance and what to dump.  
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Chapters 11, 12 and 13 are most obviously those of concern to food policy, but so is 
Energy, chapter 15, and Enterprise and Industry, chapter 20, and Competition 
policy, chapter 8, and then one realises that most concern food, not just 11-13, not 
least the first two. If there wasn’t freedom of movement for workers, there would 
be far fewer pickers of fresh fruit and vegetables on British farms, or workers in the 
cafés and hotels where employment has rocketed and now underpins the massive 
food service economy, noted in the discussion of Figure 1, above. Some food sectors 
are critically exposed with regard to labour, such as fresh food and vegetables, but 
also catering and food manufacturing (to which we return below). Partly these 
sectors have come to rely on intra-EU labour and partly, this pattern is being 
undermined by cheaper labour from outside EU. This is the basis for critics of the EU 
arguing that restrictions on migrant labour, wherever it comes from, would lead to 
more employment of UK labourers and their room to demand higher wages. This in 
turn might have knock-on effects on higher food prices for consumers. All this 
warrants calculation and exploration. Our point here, however, is that the 
apparently simple matter of leaving the acquis – whether in a ‘big bang’ after the 
two years insisted by Article 50 or slowly (the Farage option?) – is not that simple. 
The food system would unsurprisingly be affected by the systemic nature of the 
change! 
Table	4:	2013	EU	acquis	(body	of	law)	which	the	UK	applies	
	 	
Chapter 1:  Free movement of goods 
Chapter 2:  Freedom of movement for workers 
Chapter 3:  Right of establishment and freedom to provide services 
Chapter 4:  Free movement of capital 
Chapter 5:  Public procurement 
Chapter 6:  Company law 
Chapter 7:  Intellectual property law 
Chapter 8:  Competition policy 
Chapter 9:  Financial services 
Chapter 10:  Information society and media 
Chapter 11:  Agriculture and rural development 
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy  
Chapter 13: Fisheries  
Chapter 14: Transport policy  
Chapter 15:  Energy 
Chapter 16:  Taxation 
Chapter 17:  Economic and monetary policy 
Chapter 18:  Statistics 
Chapter 19:  Social policy and employment 
Chapter 20:  Enterprise and industrial policy 
Chapter 21:  Trans-European networks 
Chapter 22:  Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments 
Chapter 23:  Judiciary and fundamental rights 
Chapter 24:  Justice, freedom and security 
Chapter 25: Science and research 
Chapter 26: Education and culture 
Chapter 27:  Environment 
Chapter 28:  Consumer and health protection 
Chapter 29:  Customs union 
Chapter 30:  External relations 
Chapter 31:  Foreign, security and defence policy 
Chapter 32:  Financial control 
Chapter 33:  Financial and budgetary provisions 
Chapter 34:  Institutions 
Chapter 35:  Other issues 
   
Source: European Commission[108] 
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8.2		 At	stake	2:	Options	for	the	relationship	on	June	24	after	the	vote	
One irony, given that part of the Brexit rhetoric concerns a perceived excessive 
Eurocracy (a myth questioned above), is that Brexit would actually require a huge 
new civil service input or, if not civil servants, it would require expensive consultants 
operating as quasi civil servants, promising rich pickings for consultancy 
businesses.
36
 
The UK would have to renegotiate an estimated 12,295 EU regulations which have 
direct effect across the economy, some of which concern the food system.
37
 
Residency agreements for the 3 million EU citizens currently in the UK would be 
needed, and security for the 1.8 British passport holders living or working across the 
other 27 EU Member States would need to be established. Deals with about 50 
countries would have to be renegotiated. The UK has not negotiated its own trade 
deals since beginning to join the EU back in 1969. Outstanding debts or promises 
would have to be paid such as the 2017-20 budget contribution of around £26bn.  
This process would not be quick, unless the Government chose to do a dramatic ‘Big 
Bang’ with the threats and dislocation that would follow. This would be 
administratively uncharted waters, and as Lord Turnbull, former head of the UK Civil 
Service, has said would be “absolutely all consuming” and a job which would be 
“vast”. [109] This is a British understatement. 
Which model of ‘out’ would the UK adopt? A number have been proposed by 
analysts so far. Table 5 gives some options.  Bremain is in the Table for comparative 
purposes. These draw on the few documents in the public arena so far, advice from 
interviews, and the two recent HM Government papers from the Cabinet Office and 
the Foreign & Commonwealth office.[68-71, 110]  
One option is a customs union. The UK withdraws from the EU, but remains within 
the customs union. Goods from within the customs union can move freely, including 
British farm exports, as can those from outside once a Common External Tariff (CET) 
has been paid. However, it does not differ much from EU membership and might be 
unacceptable to opponents of membership.  It might, indeed, be unacceptable to 
the EU. Some early warnings have already been expressed, but such statements may 
just be part of the ‘smoke and mirrors’ of politics.[111]  
The ‘Norwegian’ solution would be one in which the UK joined the European 
Economic Area (EEA).
38
 This is the formal structure which unites the EU with three 
small countries – Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway - outside in what is left of the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) that had grown when the EU was taking shape in 
the 1960s. The CAP regime as such is not included in the EEA, so there would be 
scope for a domestic policy. However, more generally, it involves accepting EU 
regulations while having little or no influence on them. Norway has independence 
but has to abide by decisions, either with it silent in the policy room or left outside 
when matters become delicate. 
The ‘Switzerland’ option would be to be in European Free Trade Area (EFTA) but not 
the EEA. It has a series of bilateral treaties with the EU negotiated on a case-by-case 
basis. The difficulty as with the Norwegian solution is that a considerable body of EU 
law has to be accepted without the ability to shape it. 
A simple free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU, another option, might be the UK’s 
preferred route. How difficult it would be to achieve remains to be seen; both sides 
																																								 																					
36
 Former civil servants ‘let go’ in the shrinking of the State since 2010 already sense some 
opportunities whether in the state or within consultancies. 
37
 Many of these regulations are already ‘nationalised’ i.e. they have been put into UK law. So 
in fact, much Parliamentary time might have to be spent on ‘de-nationalising’ EU-derived 
laws in order to create new national ones. This is where the relationship with Wales and 
Scotland might become of some significance. 
38
 For the formal structures, see: http://www.efta.int/eea  
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would clearly be interested. But would it cover services as well as goods? It might be 
difficult to negotiate if either side starts to lay down red lines. Would the EU try to 
limit market access for the City, for example? If an agreement cannot be reached on 
a FTA, then the default option is for the UK and EU to trade with each other within 
the WTO system. This ‘going global solo’ might be damaging to UK farmers in terms 
of tariff barriers in Europe and free access of imports. This gets to the heart of the 
matter. Given that the UK imports twice as much food as it exports (see below), the 
Brexit argument that the UK would not face tariff barriers would be quickly tested. 
Here is also where corporate supply chains and contracts might be affected. In all 
sorts of ways, UK food trade might be disadvantaged. This might, of course, be an 
incentive for the UK to invest massively in rebuilding key sectors for health such as 
horticulture. But there is little sign of that to date.  
If the UK votes to stay in, this would not be a recipe for stasis but for continued 
participation in the evolution of EU policies and processes. As was summarised at 
the end of Part 1 of this paper, most academics and scientists working on food 
matters are concerned about the urgent need to tackle major challenges facing the 
food system at local, national, EU and global levels. These issues are, in some 
respects, already emerging onto the EU agenda – climate change, energy, obesity, 
social dislocation, sustainability - but at a frustratingly slow pace. The risk in leaving 
is that these issues can then only be tackled at the local or national level with the 
global arena left to the same frustratingly slow pace of change – or worse, delays 
and lack of leverage. 
Table	5:	Options	for	framework	of	relationship	with	the	EU	post	Brexit	
Model	 	 What	it	means	 Comment	
BREXIT: 
LEAVE EU 
Do a ‘Norway’ Be a member of the European 
Economic Area, countries outside 
the EU but almost entirely 
working to the ‘rules’ of the EU 
This is virtual EU membership without the 
participation. Norway controls its own farming 
and fishing sectors. It can negotiate trade deals 
but only subject to what doesn’t affect its EU 
trade 
Do a 
‘Switzerland’ 
Have a formally negotiated 
bilateral agreement with the EU 
This model is already in difficulty. It might be hard 
to sell to the British business but the public might 
like UK courts having primacy 
Customs 
Union 
Emulate Turkey, with full access 
for goods but not agricultural 
products or services 
Turkey very much wants to join the EU. It 
currently has tariff free access to EU for goods but 
not for agriculture, services and public 
procurement 
WTO only Trade only on a basis set by the 
World Trade Organisation 
This is the ultimate big trade club but meanwhile 
most of the world is moving towards either blocs 
like the EU or bilateral bloc agreements. This 
would be doing a ‘New Zealand’, low tariffs 
generally but not for agriculture. It would be a 
‘going global but solo’ approach. 
Free Trade 
Area with EU 
Create a new customized, pick’n’ 
mix combination of features of 
the above, perhaps as Canada is 
doing 
Uncharted territory, this would take a lot of 
negotiation, and with 27 member states unhappy 
about the UK’s departure might be protracted, 
and is also TTIP-sensitive. 
BREMAIN: 
STAY IN 
 Continue to negotiate and 
participate in EU processes 
This is the status quo, but it is not static. The EU 
and its approach to food has changed 
dramatically over time. Involvement means a role 
in shaping that rather than standing on the 
sidelines. 
 
Sources: authors, using Swinbank, Matthews, Buckwell, Grant et al.[68-71, 110] 
  
8.3		 At	stake	3:	Food	supply	and	where	UK	food	comes	from	
Food supply and self-sufficiency levels have varied, in line with UK domestic and 
foreign policy (see Table 6). The UK entered World War 2 producing about 30% of its 
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food needs. It ended producing about 60%. The lesson learned was a bitter one, and 
had been anticipated before and from World War 1. [15, 112, 113]  Food production 
had been allowed to decline since the Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. This was the 
policy point at which the UK decided to pursue a ‘cheap food’ policy, sourcing food 
from anywhere in the Empire.[114] This, like the EU Brexit debate today, was a 
significant moment in food policy, and hotly debated throughout the 1820s-50s. It 
set a tone of thinking in Whitehall and Westminster, with political strands such as 
free trade, mercantilism, market liberalism, visible today.[115] World War 1 shook 
that policy framework, and exposed the UK’s food dependency on its colonies. But it 
took a combination of 1930s recession and World War 2 to bury the policy. The 
Labour Government elected in 1945 quickly charted a different course, as any 
government would have. The 1947 Agriculture Act set out to rebuild national supply, 
setting up a system of market support and subsidies.[27] This was broadly in line 
which political and economic thinking across Europe and North America. The format 
countries took varied but there was consensus that the state should encourage 
production, and help even out the booms and slumps of trade cycles. The UK’s entry 
to the Common Market meant a shift in modes of support but not that there should 
be no support.  
Table	6:	UK	all	food	self-sufficiency	ratios	over	the	last	three	centuries	
Period	 Estimated	self-sufficiency	
pre – 1750  around 100% (in temperate produce) 
1750 – 1830s around 90-100% except for poor harvests 
1870s around 60% 
1914 around 40% 
1930s  30 - 40% 
1950s 40 - 50% 
1980s 60 – 70% 
2000s Around 60% 
 
Source: Defra 2006[116] 
Figure 3 provides Defra’s picture of what in everyday English is self-sufficiency but is 
formally terms the Food Production to Supply Ratio (FPSR).[117] This gives data 
from 1998 to 2014. This FPSR is calculated as the farm-gate value of raw food 
production (including for export) divided by the value of raw food for human 
consumption. Figure 3 shows a gentle decline since the high point of EU subsidies in 
the early 1980s. The all-food index is distinguished from ‘indigenous’ foods which 
the UK could grow itself. The UK imports apples, for instance, which could perfectly 
well be grown here, were economic and policy conditions right.  This is a point 
championed by Brexiters concerned to cast off the shackles of Brussels. 
Figure	3	UK	food	production	to	supply	ratio,	1998-2014	(by	value)
	
Source: Defra 2015[117] 
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Before joining the Common Market in 1973, the UK sourced large quantities of food 
from its former Empire. It was long-distance food, mainly reliant on shipping, as Lord 
Woolton discovered to his horror when charged with food security in 1940.[28] It 
may have been ‘cheap’ to source food from far off where land and labour were 
cheap, but it had become a strategic weakness when circumstances changed.  
Part of the politics tapped into by those favouring Brexit today is that somehow the 
past was rosier. Actually, the food supply since the UK joined the EU has been richer, 
more diverse and more regional (See Figure 4). This is particularly true for fresh 
produce (see Figure 5).  
54% of food consumed in the UK now comes from home production,  
and 27% from the EU. Table 7 gives more specific data on UK reliance on EU 
foodstuffs. Imports of pigmeat is by far the greatest, and then fresh fruit and 
vegetables. More pork could be produced in the UK, but there are important eithical 
and sustainability questions raised about supposedly ‘efficient’ intensive pig 
production systems, wherever they are located. This is a sensitive issue within the 
EU on food. UK NGOs led the EU-wide campaign to improve animal welfare 
standards for pigs and poultry in particular.[118] But some British farmers resented 
this, and blame welfare standards for squeezing them out of production. This 
situation is cited by those favouring Brexit as a reason to leave. In fact, such 
standards are a real UK contribution to improved quality of production.   
The big picture on UK food imports and exports was presented earlier in this Briefing 
in Figure 1. The UK exports £18.8 bn of food, of which £17.3 bn is processed. The UK 
imports £39.5 bn, of which £32.1bn is processed. The Food Trade Gap is  thus 
in £20.6bn defic it . Figure 5 gives the figures for imports and exports, by produce. 
The Food Trade Gap has been rising slowly for years, with a slight drop in the last 
year, and is the rationale for the current Government’s focus on exports, British 
branding and marketing.[119, 120]  The forthcoming Defra Food Nation policy 
document sets out the 25 year strategy.[121] 
39
 
 
Figure	4:	Origins	of	food	consumed	in	the	UK	2014,	by	value	
 
Source: Defra 2015[117] 
 
 
																																								 																					
39	Due at time of writing this Briefing Paper, this is set to focus on growing the market, 
encouraging competitiveness, develop resilience and maintain confidence in UK food.	
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Figure	5: The	food	trade	gap,	by	food	product,	by	£	bn 
 
Source: Defra 2015 [117] 
 
Table	7:	Reliance	on	the	EU	as	supplier	and	buyer	of	UK	food	
2014	provisional	data	
‘000	tonnes	
Cereals	 Refined	
sugar	
Fresh	
veg	
Fresh	
fruit	
Beef	and	
veal	
Pigmeat	 Mutton	
and	
lamb	
Poultry	
meat	
Production (‘000 
tonnes unless 
otherwise specified) 
24,468 1,446 2,796 427 871 820 307 1,648 
         
Imports from the EU 2,645 476 1,925 1,452 237 726 17 465 
Total imports 4,018 1,175 2,179 3,614 324 737 112 495 
EU imports as % of 
total imports 
65.83% 40.51% 88.34% 40.18% 73.15% 98.51% 15.18% 93.94% 
         
Exports to the EU 1,795 232 103 97 125 157 116 237 
Total exports 2,471 326 118 99 134 219 117 331 
EU exports as % of total 
exports 
72.64% 71.17% 87.29% 97.98% 93.28% 71.69% 99.15% 71.60% 
         
Total supply 26,016 2,295 4,857 3,942 1,061 1,338 302 1,812 
         
EU imports as % of 
total supply 
10.17% 20.74% 39.63% 36.83% 22.34% 54.26% 5.63% 25.66% 
 
Source: Defra 2015 [45] 
Whether the UK could and should produce more good food for a sustainable diet is 
to be debated, as is whether the country should reorient its food supply to meet 
sustainable dietary guidelines.[85, 92, 122] Neo-liberals reject unnecessary focus on 
home production, preferring the metrics of economic efficiency, free trade and 
markets. From a public health or environmental perspective, however, such metrics 
can be part of the problem – leading to damaging intensification.[100] Debates 
about what new goals and metrics are needed for a more sustainable food system 
are underway. It may, for example, be profitable for land to grow cereals to be fed 
to animals, which are inefficient energy converters, but it makes little ecological 
economic sense to do so. It would be better, surely, if food-producing land was in 
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future judged not by profitability or subsidy level alone but by how many people are 
fed per hectare.[123] These are the kinds of goals which a shift from the CAP to a 
Common Sustainable Food Policy or post-Brexit food system ought to espouse. 
Whether ‘In or Out’ post June 24, policy makers will have to address the need to 
make the UK food system more sustainable – healthier, lower carbon, more 
resource efficient and yet still affordable. 
8.4		 At	stake	4:	Ensuring	the	UK	population	is	well	fed	
The FAO food security indicators (based on national figures) show the UK has a more 
than ample ‘average dietary energy supply adequacy’ (the indicator). This rose from 
132% in 1994-95 to 137% in 2001-03 and has been there ever since.[124] Can the 
UK Government therefore relax about Brexit, confident that we have too much 
food? Perhaps not. Diet now has overtaken tobacco as the largest source of ill-
health in England.
40
 The most recent estimate is that diet now accounts for 10.8% of 
total disease burden and tobacco 10.7%. All studies show that the UK suffers an 
unsatisfactory diet-related health profile. Incidence of diet-related non-
communicable disease has been high, but has been coming down due to more 
focussed intervention, NHS care and some public awareness. Few people suffer rank 
starvation in the UK but inequalities of income have dramatic effects on life 
expectancy and the quality of what different British consumers eat.[125, 126]  
Increased food and its relative drop in household expenditure in the post war period 
has contributed to improved longevity. According to Public Health England and ONS 
data, life expectancy has risen by 6.4 years in the period 1990-2013, but the burden 
of disability i.e. living with ill-health, has not declined.[127] Indeed, part of the 
current reason for heated arguments over sugar is that the burden of disease is 
shifting, with people surviving but having long-term costly treatment while doing so. 
For instance, people survive with diabetes for longer than in the past but they 
endure a longer poor quality of life, and medical treatment costs rise.  
The 2014 National Diet and Nutrition Survey showed that, as a population, the UK 
consumes too much salt, sugar and fat and not enough fruit and vegetables. Only 
30% of adults aged 19-64 years and 10% of boys and 7% of girls aged 11-18 years 
meet the 5-a-day fruit and vegetable recommendation.[128] We are eating too 
much food, too much which is over-processed and not enough of the good stuff. 
Consumers then waste a considerable amount of purchased food, as if to add insult 
to injury (we return to this below).  The EU is now engaging with this via the Circular 
Economy policy package.  
The diet-health connection is complex and is one which the EU has side-stepped in 
CAP. Another reason is that Member State Governments fiercely protect healthcare 
as a matter for national competence. This is an example of the subsidiarity principle 
at work, introduced in 1992, and outlined in Article 5 of the Treaty on European 
Union.
41
 This principle is one which the UK ought to relish. It is the principle that 
“the EU does not take action (except in the areas that fall within its exclusive 
competence), unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or 
local level”.[129]   
The EU’s role in diet and health has been limited to general health promotion, with a 
tiny fraction of funds allocated to fruit and vegetable marketing. Probably the most 
important EU health role has been the CAP, set up as we noted earlier, partly for 
food security reasons. Today, besides CAP, the EU has a significant health role in 
supporting new technology, funding R&D, and regulating labelling for 
consumers.[130] Achieving better nutrition labelling has been a long-term struggle 
within the EU. Consumer and health advocates pushed for decades to get 
information improved, meeting resistance far too often.[131-133] But gains have 
been made. Nutrition labelling came in on the back of acceptance, even by elements 
of the food industry, that too many ‘dodgy’ health claims were being made by 
																																								 																					
40
 Data are collated separately for Scotland, Wales and N Ireland. 
41
 See the definition of subsidiarity and accompanying Protocols: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/subsidiarity.html  
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manufacturers. A standard nutrition label format was introduced in 2007 to fill that 
gap, and is under review.
42
   
Where might Brexit affect food and health? Modern food supply chains are 
managed through just-in-time logistics. Concerns about their disruption in the mid-
2000s led Defra to contract a study from Cranfield University. This concluded that 
terrorist or other disruption inside the UK could be contained by switching supplies 
and logistics / routes.[67]  Resilience was assured, it concluded. This analysis, 
however, did not envisage the entire food system having to be restructured, a 
systemic not just internal disruption. Yet, as has emerged, thousands of regulations 
and millions of contracts and supply routes would need to be reviewed following 
Brexit. Those favouring this course need to be clear how they would manage this. 
From a public health perspective, Brexit raises both challenges and opportunities. 
The challenge would be to put in place a Plan B for quick implementation. The UK is 
not self-sufficient. Supplies would be disrupted. The public is used to full 
supermarket shelves. The pound sterling is widely expected to drop, so imports 
would be more expensive, and reliance on world markets could raise prices, but 
could also incentive new sources at home and abroad. One key sensitivity would be 
fruit and vegetables. The UK is 40% reliant on EU imports for fruit and vegetables. 
The population ought to be eating far more horticultural produce, but even at 
current consumption levels, the capacity for disruption would be considerable for 
both UK and EU. Defra ought to consider this a priority for its Plan B. This warrants 
further research from academics, too.
43
 
Food safety is an issue which would obviously be paramount. Since the food 
scandals about food poisoning, BSE (‘mad cow disease’) and adulteration in the 
1980s and 1990s, most EU member states and many beyond have created food 
agencies and worked together to create better but appropriate food safety 
regulation and inspection.[134] The European Food Safety Authority was created in 
2002 to help harmonise such policy development, to ensure that internal and 
external trade was within high standards. The horsemeat scandal of 2012-13 
showed room for improvement but it also showed that traceability systems could be 
effective.[41] With Brexit, would pan-EU and external food safety governance 
continue or go into suspended animation, pending a new régime? 
8.5		 At	stake	5:	Food	prices	–	can	we	afford	all	this?	
Like all affluent societies, the UK has experienced a slow but dramatic change in 
food prices since World War 2.  The average household expenditure on food has 
dropped from around 25% of disposable income to under 10% today (more if eating 
out is included). The 20% lowest income households spend proportionately more, 
around 16%.[117] In 2014, the Food Research Collaboration published an 
assessment of UK food prices. In that, we presented government data suggesting 
that UK food prices were 14
th
 equal in Europe, i.e. exactly in the mid-point of 
cheapness/expensiveness.[135] However, tariffs on imports if the UK was outside 
the EU might affect this situation.  
Figure 6 gives the tariff rates that the Government suggests could be applied to UK 
goods entering the EU in the event of a Brexit. These are significant compared with 
the current zero tariff allowances.[105] It is not clear what the effects on UK food 
prices would be from Brexit. Remaining in the EU, there is at least a larger buffer 
and a close source of supply. Prices are fairly likely to rise following Brexit, due to 
disruption and sterling volatility. Studies are needed on whether this is the case and 
whether effects would be short or long term. 
																																								 																					
42
 http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/labelling_nutrition/claims/index_en.htm  
43
 See the forthcoming Food Research Collaboration briefing on the state of UK horticulture. 
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Figure	6: Tariff	rates	applied	by	the	EU,	by	broad	category	of	goods	 
 
 
 
 
3	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Source: HM Government 2016 [105] 
Table	8:	Expenditure	on	the	CAP	by	member	states			
Member	state	 2014	financial	year		(€	million)	
 
European Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund (EAGF) - 
Pillar 1 
European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EAFRD) - 
Pillar 2 
TOTAL 
Malta 6 11 17 
Luxembourg 34 1 35 
Cyprus 57 23 80 
Croatia 96 0 96 
Estonia 100 62 162 
Latvia 148 59 207 
Slovenia 147 118 265 
Slovakia 381 148 529 
Finland 525 81 605 
Lithuania 384 232 617 
Belgium 612 17 629 
Sweden 694 221 915 
Netherlands 852 111 963 
Bulgaria 602 394 996 
Austria 721 284 1,005 
Denmark 937 90 1,027 
Czech Republic 894 283 1,177 
Ireland 1,235 0 1,235 
Portugal 736 737 1,473 
Hungary 1,337 550 1,887 
Romania 1,335 823 2,157 
Greece 2,293 549 2,842 
UK 3,242 691 3,933 
Poland 3,215 1,787 5,002 
Italy 4,516 1,204 5,720 
Germany 5,197 933 6,131 
Spain 5,583 964 6,547 
France 8,370 798 9,168 
TOTAL  EU 28 44,248 11,172 55,420 
Source: Bollen, 2015
44
 
																																								 																					
44	Frank Bollen, personal communication (European Commission DG Agriculture Unit R1 
Budget Management, Brussels), January 26 2016 
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Non-electrical machinery
Minerals & metals
Petroleum
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Transport equipment
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Chemicals
Oilseeds, fats & oils
Coffee & tea
Textiles
Fruit, vegetables & plants
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One possible benefit, post Brexit, mooted by its supporters is that the UK would no 
longer contribute to the CAP. All those sums could be retained in the UK. Table 8 
gives the expenditure on CAP by EU member states. The UK’s obligations till 2020 
would remain but thereafter the UK could be a net beneficiary. UK farmers receive 
nearly £4 bn in subsidies split between pillar 1 (production support) and pillar 2 
(rural development and environment), but the UK taxpayer contributes far more to 
the EU as a whole.  
 
This total, it should be noted, is a tiny proportion of the overall expenditure £198 bn 
UK consumers spend each year on food. Evidence from the OECD (which is hawkish 
on subsidies) now shows the EU as a whole spending much less than 1% of GDP on 
total subsidies, a bit more than the USA but a dramatic drop since the mid 
1990s.[136]  The UK’s ‘national contribution’ excludes tariff revenue collected on 
imports into the UK and handed over to the EU. While EU-philes see tariff revenue 
as an EU resource, Eurosceptics argue differently. In economic terms tariff revenue 
is a transfer from the UK to the EU. 
 
Prof Allan Matthews of Trinity College Dublin has calculated the net contributions 
that each Member State makes to the CAP budget, i.e. net inflow less each member 
state’s contribution to the CAP budget.[137] Much of what each Member State 
contributes to the CAP it gets back as CAP expenditure so that the total amount 
redistributed between countries is relatively small (€13.6 bn in 2014 out of a CAP 
budget of €54 bn). 43% of this €13.6 bn was paid by Germany in 2014 with the UK 
making a much smaller contribution.45 When this contribution is related to the size 
of the member state’s gross national income (GNI), the UK is seen to be an even 
smaller net contributor with ten other EU states contributing a larger share of their 
GNI than the UK (see Figure 7). 
		
 
Figure	7:	Net	gainers	and	losers	from	CAP	expenditure,	2014	(%	GNI)	
 
Source: Mathews 2015[137] 
 
 
 
																																								 																					
45	We are most grateful to Prof Alan Matthews for these calculations.	
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8.6		 At	stake	6:	Food	and	the	Environment	
The EU’s role in environmental policy has been considerable.[138] Arguably, this has 
been one of the EU’s most positive roles in general and it has had definite and 
mostly positive effects in the food sphere. A review by IEEP of the policy and 
environmental implications of Brexit is due to be published after this Briefing 
Paper.[72]  Pending that, the general view of environmental policy analysts is that 
the EU has generally been a good thing for environmental protection. A 
comprehensive framework of thinking and directives has emerged over four 
decades, and the EU has been a champion of cross-border compliance. If anything 
shows the value of thinking beyond national borders, it is the environment. Air, 
water, sea, food, wildlife, all cross national boundaries, even when the nations are 
islands such as Ireland or the UK.  The EU has been a useful forum for international 
collaboration in this respect.  
Major improvements have been achieved, for example, in water quality where its 
actions have constrained pollution and improved removal of agrichemical residues. 
It introduced energy labelling for white goods – but shamefully excluded food from 
such labelling.
46
 The EU has also been a strong promoter of greenhouse gas 
emission reduction, and took a leading role at the Paris Climate Change talks in 
2015.[56] It has also addressed everyday behaviour such as food waste, recycling 
and waste management. Led by the UK, which championed food waste reduction 
from the mid 2000s, the EU has calculated that around 100 million tonnes of food 
are wasted annually in the EU and could rise to over 120 million tonnes by 2020, 
unless policy changes.
47
 Food waste is a key element in the rationale for the 
European Commission’s circular economy policy package launched in December 
2015.[43]  Whether in or out of the EU, food waste is a major challenge. Despite 
interventions said to have prevented 1.9 million tonnes of waste a year, in 2015 
WRAP still estimates UK food waste at 15 million tonnes (mt) out of 41 mt 
purchased. This is worth over £19 billion a year, emitting 20 mt of greenhouse gas 
(GHG).[139] 75% is avoidable. 7 mt are wasted by households, 3.9 mt by food 
manufacturing, 0.25 mt by retailing and wholesaling, 0.9mt by hospitality, and 3mt 
in out-of-home litter. Thus two thirds of the waste is consumer-linked. 
The EU has had a less favourable profile over the Common Fisheries Policy. The UK is 
a significant net importer of fish, and the catch rose from 553,000 tonnes in 1887 to 
over 1 million tonnes at the start of the 20
th
 century, and is now down to around 
400,000 tonnes.[74] The Common Fisheries Policy has been almost as contentious 
as the CAP.[140-143] NGOs, chefs and academics, let alone fisherfolk, have 
expressed deep concern about the mode of fishing controls, threats to marine life 
and the institutionalisation of waste through the ‘discards’ system.[144] Bending to 
pressure, the CFP is now (at last) steering in a better direction. Brexit could 
undermine this recent progress. Although it has radically changed EU food markets, 
the Single Market policy in this respect can operate as a useful cross-border policy 
framework. Environmental externalities become transparent.  
Although the EU has generally had a positive role on consumer labelling, 
environmental information has been excluded, despite a groundswell of pressure to 
do so. Ever since it took the lead on Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP) 
work following the 1992 Rio conference, the EU has been a melting pot for 
experimentation and policy development on whether and how to dovetail public 
and environmental health through food.[145-148] Sweden has played an 
honourable role here, having offered to take the EU lead following the Rio 
Conference. Scandinavia, e.g. through the Nordic Council, can be a force for EU 
environmental (and food safety) innovation and leadership.[149] The UK ought to be 
helping. Yet, after years of diplomacy within and between the food industry, 
																																								 																					
46
 Stanley (later Lord) Clinton-Davies, when Commissioner for the Environment (appointed by 
Prime Minister Mrs Margaret Thatcher) informed TL, newly appointed as an advisor on 
food policy in the late 1980s, that this exclusion troubled him and that food ought to be 
included in such legislation. He was and remains correct that this anomaly ought to be 
rectified. 
47
 http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/food_waste/index_en.htm 
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consumers and environmental movements which had generated high level 
consensus that sustainable diets could be an important goal for lower carbon food 
systems,[150] in 2014 the newly constituted Commission led by President Juncker 
dropped the much anticipated Sustainable Food Communiqué.  This was widely 
received outside as a retrograde step and mistake but done in the name of the 
Treaty of Lisbon agenda (now Europe 2020) of growth, jobs and a reduced 
regulatory role.
48
  
But the EU is not the only governance system to fear or to back away from 
promoting sustainable diets. When reviewing national dietary guidelines, expert 
committees have quickly concluded that these ought to include an environmental 
‘dimension’. Eating food is both a nutritional and environmental act. And consumers 
want full information. Yet too often this seemingly simple goal of providing 
population advice on how to juggle health, environmental and cost details has been 
lobbied against or rejected. Sweden first produced such advice in 2009,[151] but 
withdrew it after complaints to EFSA, almost certainly indirectly from the US meat 
industry, that the advice encouraged consumers to eat locally and seasonally. 
Sweden, a good EU member state, withdrew the advice albeit reluctantly, but has 
now launched less specific advice in the same vein.[152] In Australia, the nutrition 
guidelines review was considering sustainability advice and it too was forced to 
backtrack following fierce lobbying by the meat industry.[153, 154] In the UK, moves 
to create Integrated Advice for Consumers following the Cabinet Office Food 
Matters strategic review, were stopped when the Coalition Government was 
elected.[122] Most recently, the weighty 571 page evidence-based advice of the 
Dietary Guidelines for Americans scientific committee, which recommended new 
environmentally sensitive advice,[155] was also squashed by the agricultural lobby 
opposed to that direction. No such advice was included in what was published in 
January 2016 after a delay.[156] So far, only Qatar has managed to agree 
sustainable dietary advice.[157, 158] One might have expected that the other 
governments (of diverse political hue, it should be noted) could have accepted that 
consumers deserved such advice. This would be in accordance with the market logic 
they profess to favour! 
8.7		 At	stake	7:	Food	Labour	
The UK’s history of food work is not a happy one. The lot of the British farm labourer 
since the UK industrialised was proverbially poor – bad conditions, poor quality tied 
houses and low wages.[159] Farm labour quickly migrated to the towns even before 
the Repeal of the Corn Laws, and in droves when farming went into decline by the 
end of the 19
th
 century. In the 20
th
 century there was a shift in the labour process 
not far short of a revolution. Today, while there are less than half a million jobs on 
or near the land, and about the same in food manufacturing. The labour force in 
food service is now enormous, with food retailing not far behind. Food is the UK’s 
largest manufacturing sector.[58] For this vast combined sector, Brexit is a 
perceived threat after years of cross-border activity, lobbying, and defence. British 
consumers say they want fresh local foods, yet most picking of fresh fruit and 
vegetables has relied for years on migrant labour from within the EU. In 2008, the 
UK altered its Seasonal Agricultural Worker Scheme (SAWS).[160] And in 2013, the 
Coalition Government abolished the Agricultural Wages Board (AWB), despite 
protestations in Parliament led by Baroness Trumpington, a former Conservative 
Minister. The AWB had set ‘fair’ wages for this industrially weak labour force.
49
 Its 
main protector is now the EU Working Time Directive (2003/88/EC),[161] and the 
UK minimum wage created by the Labour Government which took effect in 1999. 
Even that minimum wage was not in fact new, and was first introduced in 1909 and 
then replaced by Wages Boards. A new variant – dubbed a National Living Wage by 
the Conservative Chancellor George Osborne – was announced in 2015.
50
 This raises 
																																								 																					
48	http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm  
49	The abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board was supported by the National Farmers 
Union and the Country Land & Business Association saying it was no longer needed. This 
means the EU legislation has become even more important in protecting farm workers. 
50
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33437115  
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the current minimum of £6.50 to £7.20 and rises to £9.00 by 2020. So policy has 
turned full circle.  
Some caution is in order. This coincides with cuts elsewhere in national budgets to 
welfare support, so its advance is yet to be worked through. The cost of food (see 
previous section) is an integral part of living wage demands. What is the point of 
higher or lower wages if food prices rise or lower in tandem? What matters is 
relative cost, and whether the cost of the diet purchased with wages is good for 
health and sustainable i.e. whether wages can purchase a sustainable diet.[122, 
162] Nevertheless, the commitment reflected the strong pressure and effective 
campaigning for a real living wage by Citizens UK, a community movement.  
More broadly, the Referendum debate is heavily imbued with concerns about 
migration, with appeals to regain control over borders having a strong popular, not 
to say populist, appeal. The UK is not, it should be remembered, a signatory to the 
Schengen agreement.[163] While there is general freedom of movement within the 
EU, as per the Treaty of Rome, the UK retains border controls. In the food sector, 
there has been particular use of intra-EU labour on farms. There has also been a 
worrying minority use of forced labour, particularly of illegal labour.[164] This came 
to public attention with the shocking deaths of 23 Chinese cockle pickers on 
Morecambe Bay in 2004.  Such labour is too often characterised by low wages 
(below the Minimum Wage), excessive hours, debt bondage, gang-masters 
brutalism, and sub-standard housing. The UK took its own legal stance on stamping 
such practices out, and created the Gangmasters Licensing Authority.[165] The EU’s 
role here has been to set pan-European standards for the length of time people 
work per day, the Working Time Directive. This has irritated employers but been a 
support for employees. It remains a key social element of the EU policy package.  
Table 9 gives the number of people employed in the food sectors by origin. Food 
manufacturing, and food service are high users of EU labour. 27% of the UK 
workforce in the manufacture of food products comes from across the EU and 17% 
of the UK workforce in accommodation (hotels etc.).  Manufacture of food products 
has the highest proportion of EU employees of all 87 sectors listed in this source, 
with accommodation the third highest.  Food and beverage service activities is the 
ninth largest user of EU employees out of the 87 listed sectors. Brexit would almost 
certainly disrupt this state of affairs. This might have more direct and immediate 
effects on more of the population than farm labour, perhaps. A full-blown employee 
crisis would only arise in extreme circumstances such as if rights of workers were 
revoked; more likely is a slow strangulation of the food labour market creating a 
difficulty for replacing workers over time. These scenarios deserve more research. 
 
Table	9	Numbers	employed	in	the	UK	by	origin	2014	
	 From	the	UK	 From	the	rest	of	the	EU	
	 Number	 %	of	total	 Number	 %	of	total	
Crop, animal production, hunting 299,165 90.1% 21,101 6.4% 
Manufacture of food products 224,396 63.3% 95,351 26.9% 
Manufacture of beverages 58,122 94.4% 1,675 2.7% 
Accommodation 266,075 72.7% 62,004 16.9% 
Food and beverage service activities 880,125 71.7% 138,140 11.3% 
Total employed in UK 25,560,030 84.6% 1,833,655 6.1% 
 
Source: ONS personal communication, 2016 [166] 
 
 
 
F
o
o
d
 R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
 C
o
ll
a
b
o
r
a
ti
o
n
	
	
33	 Food,	the	UK	and	the	EU:	Brexit	or	Bremain?	
8.8		 At	stake	8:	Food	culture,	the	hearts	and	minds	issue	
This list of issues potentially at stake concludes with the matter of food culture. This 
deserves serious consideration in the Brexit debate, something it has not so far 
received. Food is about identity. And British culinary identity – long troubled and 
often criticised for being unimaginative[167, 168] – actually has rich roots, altered 
by industrialisation two centuries ago and the battle for ‘cheap food’ won by 
industrial interests with the Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846.[169] Early food 
campaigners in the post World War 2 period such as Raymond Postgate, founder of 
the Good Food Guide, and Elizabeth David, doyenne of food writers, and Derek 
Cooper, presenter of BBC Radio 4’s Food Programme, worked tirelessly for the 
rebirth of good food for all. Decent food, a good range of choice, the capacity to be 
able to cook with confidence, a fair degree of knowledge about food quality, these 
are the hallmarks of a confident food culture. Above all, a good food culture is about 
a decent level for all – hence the importance of modern campaigns about the 
impact of low incomes on food intake.[170-172] 
When the UK joined the Common Market in 1973, four decades of food cultural 
exchange and change began. Airline routes opened up. Holidays became easier. 
Passport controls altered. Exchange of healthcare, if taken ill on holiday, followed. 
Southern European foods – olive oils, peaches, fresh horticultural produce – entered 
UK supermarkets. British holidays opened us to culinary options never known except 
by many ordinary British except through military service, perhaps. The British 
became wine drinkers on a scale never known before, except possibly by an affluent 
élite. The British took to European cuisines. They became interested in food!  British 
cooking and food tastes have been transformed. The old jokes about lousy British 
food have been rendered obsolete. Cities and towns have become proud of good 
restaurants and the rebirth of regional culinary culture. TV chefs became celebrities. 
Eating out has been normalised. Pizza is now children’s favourite food; many think 
pasta ‘British’. This is cultural exchange on a massive scale.  
This Europeanisation of UK food culture is surely to be acknowledged, indeed 
treasured. It is not directly caused by the EU. Drivers are increased wealth, travel, 
education and generational shift. But membership of the EU has been part of that, 
too, easing flow of food. Culturally, the significance is perhaps on a par with the 
saying that people who eat together are less likely to fight each other - although 
normal family life can sometimes suggest otherwise! There are counter trends, too, 
and many examples of deracinated foods. Cheddar cheese is made everywhere as 
though it is not named after one place in Somerset, south west England! Critics 
worry about mock ‘local’ foods.
51
 Consumer aspirations for the local are subverted. 
Cafés are likely to be chains rather than small scale family enterprises. Some of this 
process is the result of commercialisation, supermarketisation and corporate 
concentration rather europeanisation. And there are reactions to that. The 
rebuilding of the British cheese sector is often cited as one example.
52
 So is the 
renaissance of real bakeries, and the celebration of artisanal production and local 
foods. The growth of new patterns of diversity is a testament to the liquidity of the 
European project as transformed by ordinary people. This is people voting with their 
weekly shopping and lifestyles, learning and experimenting with their foods. This is 
not to be ignored, surely, in the Brexit debate.  Will the British have the confidence 
to move forward and accept this remarkable post-war culinary learning?  
																																								 																					
51
 See the complexity identified in the EU 7
th
 Framework GLAMUR project: http://glamur.eu/  
52
 There are an estimated 100 more UK artisanal cheeses now than in France according to the 
British Cheese Awards. 
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CONCLUSIONS	
The Brexit/Bremain debate is of considerable significant for food in the UK. Many 
complex issues have been raised in this Briefing Paper.  
In our view, the real agenda facing the UK food system and food systems at all levels 
- local, national, regional, European and global – is the need to move rapidly to a 
more sustainable basis. The food systems built by the rich world are now widely 
agreed to be unsustainable. Ecosystems are under threat from food. Our food 
systems are too carbon intensive, and waste water, land and material resources. 
They play major roles in threatening the future. The health externalities, too, are 
immense. Diet is the greatest contributor to the burden of disease. Food is 
systemically wasted. The UK and EU have to address this challenge whether 
together or separately. We detect some reluctance to accept this in the Referendum 
debate so far.  
Faced with such challenges, one can legitimately argue, as we have above, that the 
Brexit debate is at worst a side issue or deviation, and at best a serious distraction. 
Yet it is now serious politics. Like many academics we are deeply concerned about 
the Referendum disrupting policy energies and capacities which ought to be working 
together. The vote is already in danger of dividing political parties, the country and 
the EU which is, despite imperfections, one important mechanism for facing the 
complex food challenges ahead.  
The British people will decide on June 23. Making individual decisions should not 
blind us to the urgent need to work collaboratively with other countries to move 
towards food sustainability. This Briefing Paper has suggested both positive and 
negative aspects of current policy at the EU level. While academics and civil society 
organisations have been loud but reasoned critics of the food policy status quo, the 
verdict on the EU cannot be simply put in black and white. The EU has been 
progressive on some food fronts such as the environment, food safety, water 
quality, but has hindered progress on other fronts. It has been a bulwark against 
powerful forces, but it also is subverted by them. It has built post World War 2 food 
security but it also is now currently undermining moves to create a level playing field 
for more sustainable diets.  
As a governance system, the EU can be criticised for being too slow, too 
cumbersome, too timid – sometimes all of these. The Commission is certainly 
currently in ‘minimalist’ ‘don’t dare to do too much’ mode. Brexiters, however, are 
seemingly unconcerned by the threat to food from a drop (or volatility) in the value 
of sterling. And precisely how will the UK sever food ties with its main source of food 
imports? The Brexit option exposes the current dire state of UK food dependency on 
non UK food sources. This is the result of 170 years of policy pursuit of cheap food 
sourced from wherever and suggests a misuse of the UK’s ample and well-watered 
land with food growing potential.  
This Briefing Paper concludes that the UK should wake up to the enormity of 
unravelling 43 years of co-negotiated food legislation and exchange. There is a 
worrying lack of clarity as to what would be sought on June 24 by the Government 
should the people vote to Brexit. This is food politics at a high level, with splits in the 
Conservative Right so far setting the tone and direction of the debate. In the run up 
to the vote, Brexiters should be asked what they would do about food planning. And 
Bremainers should be pressed to redouble efforts to get the UK food system onto a 
more sustainable footing.  
Hopefully, this Briefing Paper has offered some clarity about the significance and 
importance of food when perusing the Referendum options. Whether the people 
vote to Bremain or Brexit, the sustainability challenges must be engaged with by 
academics, civil society organisations and the people. They must be addressed with 
renewed vigour. We must not lose sight of the real food challenges. They remain 
urgent whatever the vote.	
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